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An Introduction to the Wage Curve 
David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald 
En conomists and policymakers are interested in understanding the forces 
that determine the level of unemployment and the level of wages. This 
paper describes an empirical discovery-made with the help of interna- 
tional microeconometric evidence covering more than a dozen nations-about a 
link between these two variables. The connection can be portrayed on a graph 
with the level of unemployment on the horizontal axis and the level of wages on 
the vertical axis. Then the "wage curve," as shown in Figure 1, is a downward- 
sloping locus. This relationship tells us that (holding others things constant) if 
a region has a rise in unemployment in a particular year, those who live there 
will have a fall in their wages in that year. 
What does this curve mean? How, in a field where fully controlled experi- 
ments are almost impossible, could there be any convincing scientific basis for 
this wage curve? What is the relationship between the wage curve and a Phillips 
curve, other than that the curve of Figure 1 looks like a Phillips curve with the 
vertical axis mislabeled? How does the wage curve fit into existing economic 
knowledge, and is the empirical finding consistent with competitive theory? 
This paper sketches answers to these kinds of questions. The discussion draws 
on our book, The Wage Curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), where the 
points raised here are investigated more fully. It also rests upon work done by 
other economists whose work is listed in the paper and the bibliography. 
* David G. Blanchflower is Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College, 
Hanover, New Hampshire, and Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Andrew J. Oswald is Senior Research 
Fellow, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, Lon- 
don, United Kingdom. 
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Uncovering the Wage Curve 
Any construction rests ultimately upon its methods and raw materials. The 
modus operandi in research on the wage curve has been to use random samples 
of workers and establishments. These data come from various nations. When the 
same statistical methods are employed on each nation's sample, the interna- 
tional data sets reveal approximately the same answer-that is, they seem to 
point again and again to a curve that resembles Figure 1. 
In The Wage Curve, the size of sample varies from one part of the world to 
another. The years sampled also vary. For the United States, for example, the 
analysis draws upon the Current Population Surveys from 1964 to 1991. This 
provides a sample of more than 1.5 million American workers. Some recorded 
interviews in the 1960s; others did so a quarter of a century later. A similarly 
large sample is available for South Korea. That country's Occupational Wage 
Surveys of 1971, 1983 and 1986 offer the investigator information on approxi- 
mately 1.4 million employees. At the other end of the spectrum, there are results 
for small countries, like Switzerland and Norway. In these cases, the samples are 
of less than 3000 people in each nation. Many of these data are from the 
International Social Survey Programme, a multicountry collaborative project in 
which survey teams from a dozen nations asked the same questions of random 
samples of individuals from each of the countries (Jowell, Witherspoon and 
Brook, 1989). Overall, the data in The Wage Curve provide information on 
approximately 3.5 million people, from 12 countries. 
The wage curve is found by estimating large regression equations. The 
procedure is the following. For each person, from each country, the data sets 
record the individual's level of pay and his or her personal characteristics. In 
most instances, the name of the region in which the worker lives is also recorded 
in the data set. Rates of unemployment vary, as is well known, from one region 
to another and from one country to another. The analysis matches those 
unemployment rates to the sampled individuals. In other words, if Miss X of 
San Francisco is known to be earning $12,000 per year in 1981, the unemploy- 
ment rate in California in that year can be merged into the data set and treated 
as a variable that is potentially relevant in explaining the level of Miss X's pay. 
For Britain, similarly, the sample might include information on Mr. Y working 
in Edinburgh in the year 1974. The 1974 unemployment rate for Scotland, 
therefore, can be added to the data set as a possible influence upon Mr. Y's 
remuneration in that year. Repeating this process many times gives information 
on a large number of workers' pay levels and, in each case, an associated 
unemployment rate in the person's region. 
What emerges from the data is a pattern linking pay and unemployment. A 
representative table of unemployment elasticities is given in Table 1. The 12 
coefficients summarized in Table 1 are negative and in most cases well defined. 
As a crude characterization of the data, a typical wage curve is described by the 
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Figure 1 
The Wage Curve 
local unemployment rate 
formula In w = -0.1 In U + other terms, where In w is the logarithm of the 
wage, and In U is the logarithm of the unemployment rate in the worker's area. 
Since both the local rate of unemployment and the wage are entered as 
logarithms, the coefficient on unemployment represents proportional change 
and can be read off as an elasticity. The other terms in the equation are variables 
for personal characteristics of the worker, like age, gender, race, years of 
schooling, and "fixed effects," which refer to controls for regions or industries. 
For example, in the U.S. data it is especially important to control for regional 
fixed effects-that is, to include a set of regional dummies or to difference the 
data. 
This practice of treating regions as mini-economies provides many more 
units of observation than in conventional macroeconomics. For the United 
States, for example, some results focus upon 50 states through the 1980s, rather 
than on 10 annual aggregate time-series data points. Occasionally the analysis 
looks at industries rather than regions, but the underlying idea, that of uncover- 
ing the links between unemployment and earnings by using disaggregated 
information, remains the same. 
For Britain, Canada and the United States, the estimates of the unemploy- 
ment elasticity of earnings lie in a range from -0.08 to -0.11 in almost all 
specifications. For some nations, there are few years of data across which to 
pool, and it is then to be expected that the inclusion of regional dummies will 
weaken the power of the analysis and lead to low t-statistics. Southern Ireland is 
the only real outlier. Its coefficient is so unstable that the results were almost left 
out; they should be treated skeptically. Korea, for which an industry wage curve 
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Table 1 
Wage Curves in 12 Nations 
Fixed 
effects 
Coefficient Y = yes 
Dependent on Log U N = no 
Country Variable Data Set (t-statistics) S = some Sample size 
USA Annual earnings Current Population -.10 Y 1,730,175 
Survey 1963-90 (25.0) 
Britain Monthly earnings General Household -.08 Y 175,500 
Survey 1973-90 (6.2) 
Canada Gross annual Survey of -.09 Y 82,739 
earnings Consumer (6.1) 
Finances 1972-87 
S. Korea Gross monthly Occupational -.04* Y 1,359,387 
earnings Wage Surveys (25.7) 
1971-86 
Austria Gross monthly ISSP 1986 & 89 -.09 S 1,587 
earnings (1.6) 
Italy Gross monthly ISSP 1986-9 -.10 Y 1,041 
earnings (0.6) 
Holland Net monthly ISSP 1988-91 -.17 S 1,867 
earnings (2.2) 
Switzerland Net monthly ISSP 1987 -.12 N 645 
earnings (3.6) 
Norway Gross yearly ISSP 1989-91 -.08 S 2,599 
earnings (2.2) 
S. Ireland Net monthly ISSP 1988-91 -.36 N 1,363 
earnings (1.9) 
Australia Weekly income IDS 1986 -.19 N 8,429 
(5.8) 
Germany Gross monthly ISSP 1986-91 -.13 Y 4,629 
earnings (1.8) 
Notes: These are coefficients on local unemployment variables in microeconometric wage equa- 
tions. The equations are estimated using the numbers of observations stated in the final column. 
ISSP is the International Social Survey Programme. 
Log U is defined as the logarithm of an area unemployment rate at various levels of disaggregation 
in different countries. T-statistics are in parentheses. Where indicated by a *, unemployment is 
measured at the industry level. The dependent variable, pay, is in natural logarithms. "Fixed effects" 
refer to controls for region or industries. In all equations, personal variables (gender, race, age, 
schooling, etc.) are included as controls. 
Where few years of data are available, countries' unemployment coefficients sometimes weaken when 
full regional dummies are added. This table is meant only to be representative. Fuller results are in 
the book The Wage Curve. 
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alone can be estimated, has an unemployment elasticity of - 0.04, which is 
somewhat lower than the other figures in the table. 
The typical finding seems to be that a hypothetical doubling of the local 
unemployment rate is associated-consistent with early evidence discussed in 
Oswald (1986)-with a drop in pay of one-tenth (that is, a 100 percent rise in 
unemployment causes a 10 percent fall in the level of wages). Though not given 
here, there is evidence that the unemployment elasticity of pay differs among 
certain subgroups. It is higher for the young, the unskilled and those outside 
unions. 
A worker who is employed in an area of high unemployment earns less 
than an identical individual who works in a region with low joblessness. 
Surprisingly, the nature of the relationship appears to be the same in different 
countries. The wage curve in the United States is very similar to the wage curves 
in, for example, Britain, Canada and Norway. Moreover, other economists have 
estimated wage curves for further nations. Montgomery (1993) obtains an unem- 
ployment elasticity of pay for Japan of -0.15 or less. Rebick's (1995) Japanese 
results are similar. Hoddinott (1993) produces an estimate of - 0.13 for the Cote 
d'Ivoire. This is doubly interesting, because it is one of the first estimates of the 
local unemployment elasticity of pay for a developing country, and because the 
calculated number is so like that in the industrialized West. Bhalotra (1993) 
finds a negative effect for India. Although the coefficient is not always well 
determined, once regional dummies are included, her estimated elasticity at the 
mean is, somewhat remarkably, again -0.13. Edin and Holmlund (1989), 
Holmlund and Skedinger (1990) and Edin, Holmlund and Ostros (1994) esti- 
mate a small negative coefficient for regional unemployment in Sweden. Fur- 
ther results are in Groot, Mekkelholt and Oosterbeek (1992) for the Netherlands, 
Wagner (1994) for Germany, and Winter-Ebmer (1995) for Austria. Other studies 
offering some support for the wage curve include the work of Blackaby and 
Manning (1987, 1990), Card (1990), Christofides and Oswald (1992), Freeman 
(1988, 1991), Katz and Krueger (1991, 1992), and Lemieux (1993). Some early 
findings for Britain and the United States are reported in Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990). 
This uniformity was probably not expected by any researcher and seems 
remarkable. By the standards of modern economics, the picture of a wage curve 
where the elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is -0.1 seems to be 
a consistent one. However, much remains to be done in explaining the relation- 
ship, and that is the concern of later sections of the paper. 
Checks and Criticisms 
This journal is not the place for an in-depth discussion of the statistical 
nature of the wage curve, but three potential criticisms are worth a brief airing 
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here. For more detailed responses, the interested reader should consult our book, 
The Wage Curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). 
The first concern is a possible simultaneity bias. The wage curve equations 
show wages depending on unemployment. However, unemployment may also 
depend upon pay, perhaps through the functioning of a downward-sloping 
labor demand curve. In this case, ordinary least squares estimation of the wage 
curve is flawed by a lack of allowance for simultaneity bias. Attractive though 
such thinking is theoretically, little support for it can be found empirically. One 
approach is to use instrumental variables like weather variables, military spend- 
ing, industry mix or lagged unemployment in estimating a wage curve equa- 
tion. Such an approach produces estimates of the elasticity of earnings with 
respect to unemployment that are only fractionally higher than those from 
ordinary least squares methods. At least in this context, unemployment appar- 
ently has the characteristics of a predetermined variable. 
A second criticism is possible bias from common-group effects-in this case 
where the independent variable (unemployment) is more highly aggregated 
than the dependent variable (wages). The nature of the difficulty, which is 
routinely ignored in empirical research, is explained in sources such as Moulton 
(1986). When a correction is done, the substantive findings of the research 
remain unchanged. 
A third potential criticism is that to measure real wages in different regions 
one should have regional consumer price data. However, these data are often 
not available. Although this problem is a real one, there are reasons to think 
that it is not too serious. Controlling for regional prices in Britain, where the 
data are available, leaves the wage curve intact. Nominal wages are likely to be 
sufficient whenever year dummies and regional dummies can be, as for most 
countries, included in the regression equations. The evidence for an industry 
wage curve, moreover, is presumably immune to the criticism that there are not 
geographical deflators. Finally, if prices depend dominantly upon wages and a 
constant, they can be substituted out to leave a nominal reduced-form wage 
equation. 
Explanations and Interpretations 
The evidence suggests that the wage curve is not the product of some 
mechanical error, or of a compositional omission or bias, or of some failure to 
control for hours of work or the automatic drops in income of those who lose 
jobs. It does not seem to be a special result that can be discerned only in 
particular time periods or places. Therefore, it provides a theoretical challenge. 
One obvious interpretation is to think of the wage curve as a method for the 
calculation of an index of wage rigidity, or "stickiness." This index is easily 
understood. It is a measure of the responsiveness of workers' remuneration to the 
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amount of excess supply in the local labor market. This is captured in the wage 
curve by the coefficient on log unemployment in an equation for log earnings. 
Remarkably, despite countries' institutional differences, they exhibit more uni- 
formity in wage flexibility than has been thought. Put more technically, the 
local unemployment elasticity of pay appears to be approximately the same 
across nations. 
Most economists react to an empirical phenomenon by reaching, at least 
initially, for supply-and-demand analysis. Could a framework of that kind 
explain the wage curve? At first glance, it seems not. Unemployment in the 
neoclassical model of the labor market results when the wage exceeds the 
market-clearing level. The numbers of individuals who wish to supply their 
labor then exceeds the number whom firms wish to employ. The higher the 
wage, the greater the degree of unemployment. In a framework of the textbook 
kind, where unemployment is the gap between a supply curve of labor and a 
demand curve for labor, wages and unemployment are positively associated. 
This is the reverse of the empirically estimated curve in Figure 1. 
However, the demand-and-supply model of the labor market cannot be 
dismissed quite this easily. Unemployment might be viewed as a voluntary 
choice by workers. Many commentators have pointed out that this is difficult to 
square with the distress shown by people when they lose their jobs. Neverthe- 
less, there is a tradition within economics that questions the usefulness of the 
concept of "involuntary" unemployment. Thus, a possible way to make the 
wage curve consistent with a demand-and-supply analysis is to suggest that the 
curve is some kind of labor-supply function. Then, the key assumption is that 
unemployment is the negative of employment. If the potential labor force is 
fixed at some number greater than the level of employment on a labor supply 
curve, unemployment does not have to be thought of as a gap between the 
quantity of labor supplied and demanded. It could be viewed as the gap between 
labor supply and a fixed labor force. 
Logical and empirical difficulties then spring up. In particular, the unem- 
ployed in this definition are not offering their labor for sale. This seems 
inconsistent with the technical definition of unemployment used by most 
government survey agencies and perhaps runs counter to common sense. 
One can test a labor-supply interpretation of the wage curve by comparing 
the explanatory power, within a wage equation, of both unemployment and 
conventional measures of the supply of labor. If unemployment is a mismea- 
sured version of a normal labor-supply relationship, it should perform statisti- 
cally less well, as a predictor of wages, than labor-supply variables like the 
participation rate or the employment/population rate. Empirically, however, it 
does not. In short, the evidence does not offer support for the idea that the 
negative correlation between pay and unemployment is explained by a labor- 
supply function. 
We believe that a demand-and-supply framework is the wrong way to think 
about the labor market. As Solow (1990, p. 3) and others have suggested, there 
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may be something special about labor as a commodity and, therefore, about the 
labor market itself. 
The Wage Curve and Harris-Todaro Compensating Differentials 
To economists raised on the Harris-Todaro (1970) and Hall (1970, 1972) 
models, the wage curve may be a surprise. Those models predict the reverse 
slope. By the requirement for a spatial equilibrium in which all regions provide 
the same expected utility, high-unemployment areas ought also to be high-wage 
regions. In other words, to ensure that nasty and nice features of regions cancel 
out, the wage locus should have a positive gradient. This hypothesis is as 
decisively rejected by international microeconomic data as it is possible to 
imagine. This raises doubts about conventional wisdom in U.S. labor and 
regional economics. 
That does not mean, however, that the idea of compensating differentials is 
wrong, or irrelevant. Movements in actual wages can be negatively correlated 
with movements in actual unemployment, while at the same time "permanent" 
unemployment, put loosely, is positively related to "permanent" wages. Migra- 
tion is presumably driven by these permanent values. On one interpretation, the 
mistake that the early empirical literature made was to omit controls for 
regional fixed effects, that is, to leave regional dummies out of the estimated 
wage equations. Once those dummies are included, Hall's (1970, 1972) predicted 
positive spatial correlation between pay and joblessness-the result in theory of 
compensating differentials across regions-comes out empirically as strongly 
negative. 
A Noncompetitive Labor Market Explanation? 
If the competitive market model gives an unconvincing rationalization of 
the wage curve, noncompetitive accounts of the labor market must be consid- 
ered. In a bargaining model, a high degree of joblessness in the surrounding 
labor market might reduce the ability of workers to claim a large share of the 
surplus to be divided. A possible story-one theory of the wage curve-is that 
outside unemployment frightens workers. This may be because if something 
goes wrong, and individual workers need to obtain other jobs, finding jobs is 
likely to be harder when the local labor market is depressed. Therefore, al- 
though some details of the process here remain cloudy, rising joblessness might 
be thought to spawn declining levels of pay. A variant on this species of 
explanation relies on the explicit assumption of a trade union that worries 
about both its employed members and its unemployed members. High unem- 
ployment means that more of its members are likely to be without work and 
that an employed member who is dismissed or laid-off will have difficulty 
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finding new employment. An increase in unemployment may then tilt the 
union's preferences towards a greater concern with the number of jobs. If this 
implies a reduced concern for pay, or at least a slightly smaller weight on the 
target of high remuneration for union members, a lower negotiated level of pay 
could result. 
While a bargaining or union approach might thereby render intelligible 
the pattern in the data of the wage curve, such an interpretation could be viewed 
as inappropriate in many settings outside western Europe and even in some 
industrial sectors within that part of the globe. Unionism is not pandemic. In 
the United States, the great majority of those who hold jobs do not belong to a 
trade union. This does not make bargaining theory irrelevant, but it raises some 
doubts about its pertinence. 
A second noncompetitive way to provide an intellectual rationale for the 
wage curve is by appealing to efficiency wage theory. This approach is intrinsi- 
cally nonunion, so it is potentially suitable for economies that are more like 
America than Sweden. The well-known characteristic of efficiency wage analysis 
is that firms set pay in an environment where the wage influences productivity. 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is an archetypal case. In equilibrium, firms try to 
maximize profits, and workers choose how hard to work. The outside rate of 
unemployment plays a central role, because it determines the ease with which a 
sacked worker can get another job. In a highly depressed labor market, employ- 
ees are frightened of losing their jobs and so put in high effort even if pay is 
comparatively low. Put differently, a marginal rise in unemployment leads to a 
corresponding marginal fall in the level of wages. The reason is that firms can 
reduce pay slightly while still maintaining a motivated workforce. Unemploy- 
ment here is a discipline device: when it is high, the generosity of workers' 
remuneration can be set low. Hence, there is an efficiency wage interpretation of 
the wage curve. 
Yet a further possibility is a halfway house between a union model and 
competitive theory. A "labor contract" model might be able to explain the 
negative correlation between wages and unemployment. In some versions of 
labor contract theory, wages and employment are positively correlated. A con- 
tract curve slopes upwards-meaning that wages and employment rise together 
-because when the wage rate is high, it is sensible for the workers and their 
firm to ensure that as many as possible of those in the labor pool have jobs. To 
those economists raised on neoclassical labor demand theory, this argument 
may have a strange ring to it. Should not employment be low when the price of 
labor is high? In this contractual framework, the answer is that it should not. 
An efficient labor contract maximizes the joint welfare of employer and employ- 
ees. Unemployed workers contribute only a little to the surplus earned by the 
combination. The higher the level of pay, the more desirable it is, from the 
combination's point of view, to have extra individuals in work and fewer 
individuals drawing unemployment benefits. An upward-sloping contract curve 
here acts as a quasi-supply curve. It is therefore worth considering as another 
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potential source of a negatively inclined relationship between pay and unem- 
ployment. 
There is a variant on this approach. Consider a situation in which demand 
shocks occur randomly, and the firm has to design a remuneration package that 
will both make it money and attract sufficient employees. If the firm dislikes 
risk, it will wish the wage to rise in good times and to fall in bad times. When 
there is a boom, many workers are employed. In a slump, some are laid off. 
Again, there is the basis here for a model in which pay and unemployment are 
negatively related. 
Which of these theories is the most plausible? The wage curve in labor 
contract theories is not truly a causal relationship, because the changes in the 
level of unemployment do not cause the wage level to move. The apparent 
interdependence of the variables is a trick of the eye. This approach therefore 
suffers one of the disadvantages of the competitive demand-and-supply appara- 
tus. It is inherently about employment rather than unemployment. To be 
convincing, it requires some additional theoretical justification. Our guess is 
that the wage curve is explained instead by bargaining or efficiency wage forces. 
But there is still much to be learned. 
During the last few years, macroeconomics has begun to offer a generation 
of new models in which an aggregate wage curve (in this paper's terminology) is 
the primary distinguishing feature. The history of this current research is 
discussed in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Phelps (1990). Influential 
early contributions include Rowthorn (1977), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and 
Layard and Nickell (1986). The same kind of model was presented by David 
Soskice in unpublished Oxford lectures in the 1970s, and is contained in the 
textbook by Carlin and Soskice (1990). The gist of all the work is that, in the 
1980s, "a surrogate employment supply curve, or equilibrium wage curve, was 
born"(Phelps, 1992, p. 1004). A recent book by Lindbeck (1993) adopts the same 
approach and uses the assumption that there is a wage-setting curve, different 
from and to the left of conventional atomistic supply, that slopes upwards in 
real-wage/employment space. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) offer another model in 
which a central part is played by the same form of wage equation, in this case 
motivated by a fairness approach. For another recent discussion, see Woodford 
(1994). 
As Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Layard and Nickell (1986) make clear, 
the novel aspect of these models is not their assumptions about labor demand, 
which are standard. Rather, it is that the models replace the conventional labor 
supply curve with a wage-fixing function. The crucial constituent part in this 
way of thinking is a fairly flat but negatively sloped curve linking the level of 
pay to the level of unemployment. This allows the theories to be consistent with 
both involuntary unemployment and the paradoxical fact, noted by Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1993) and others, that real wages fluctuate little while the long-run 
supply of workers appears close to vertical. As this paper tries to make clear, 
there is now international microeconometric evidence for such a curve. 
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More on the Wage Curve vs. Supply and Demand 
A few economists, particularly those convinced that it makes sense to use 
the same model when studying the labor market as when studying the market 
for strawberries, may look with surprise at the correlation at the heart of the 
paper. These readers may see the wage curve as an inexplicable reduced-form 
equation. Where, they may ask, are the structural neoclassical model and the 
supply-demand specification that any satisfactory research must, surely, con- 
tain? This reaction is a sensible one, and, over the years, it has probably helped 
the discipline of economics to advance. But it is dictated by habit, and it carries 
with it the danger that the idea of the wage curve will be pushed aside because it 
is outside our preset mental pictures. 
A common mistake is to argue in the following way. The wage curve, 
seminar discussants sometimes say, looks consistent with a normal supply-and- 
demand model that is repeatedly in disequilibrium. This is because bad demand 
shocks occur at the same time as low pay, and that fact is what is being picked 
up by the econometric equations. However, such an argument seems wrong. It 
confuses the idea of falling wages (which is what the competitive model predicts 
when there is high unemployment) with low pay (which is what the wage curve 
shows there to be empirically when there is high unemployment). 
The purpose of the research behind the wage curve has been, among other 
things, to question the notion that labor market outcomes are usefully viewed as 
cutting points on graphs inscribed with demand functions and supply func- 
tions. It would not make sense, therefore, to glance into the research and ask to 
be shown the underlying demand-and-supply framework behind the data's 
configuration. The wage curve replaces the labor supply curve. 
The Wage Curve and the Phillips Curve 
A first look at the wage curve conjures up thoughts of the curve noticed by 
A. W. Phillips (1958), using nine decades of British aggregate data. The Phillips 
curve, however, is not what is being estimated in research on the wage curve. 
Why, exactly? 
First, the Phillips curve links the rate of change of pay to the aggregate 
unemployment rate. The wage curve links the level of pay to the local unem- 
ployment rate. Crucially, the Phillips curve is about inflation, and the wage 
curve is not; and (less important) the Phillips curve is about the effect of 
aggregate unemployment, and the wage curve is about the role of local unem- 
ployment. Anyone tempted to argue that there is little difference between pay 
and pay inflation might ponder how they would feel as an astronaut being shot 
up at the moon by a group of physicists who had confused, in their technical 
calculations, the concepts of velocity and acceleration. Second, the Phillips 
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curve is traditionally estimated on time-series macroeconomic data. The wage 
curve is estimated on pooled cross sections of microeconomic data. Third, as a 
matter of interpretation, the Phillips curve was proposed as a disequilibrium 
adjustment mechanism. This is how it has entered the minds of countless 
undergraduates and politicians. In our conception, the wage curve is an equilib- 
rium locus that is a description neither of inherently temporary phenomena nor 
of transitory dynamics. 
Nevertheless, as Manning (1993) has argued, there may be other ways to 
defend the idea of a Phillips curve. It would be quite wrong, too, to view the 
wage curve as outside the tradition that Phillips began. Phillips' underlying 
concern, to understand the macroeconomic influence of joblessness upon wage 
setting, is continued here. Even so, if he had had access to microeconomic data, 
it is possible that A. W. Phillips might not be remembered today as a student of 
inflation. 
There is a modern literature that attempts to distinguish between dynamic 
models, like the Phillips curve, and the properties of long-run equilibrium, 
which may be captured by a wage curve. These "error-correction models" 
suggest that it is valuable to specify Phillips-style equations with an extra 
lagged wage-level term on the right. In the steady state, when wage change has 
gone to zero, such a model can exhibit a connection between wage levels and 
unemployment levels. Sargan (1964) may have been the first such paper, al- 
though, because of its poorly defined standard errors, the substantive results 
about wage determination are not compelling. 
In the microeconometric work on wage curves, when lagged values of 
wages are added as independent variables (along with the level of unemploy- 
ment), they usually have a coefficient close to zero. Unemployment explains 
pay, but past levels of pay do not explain present levels of pay, and unemploy- 
ment does not, in any simple sense, explain inflation. It is possible that the 
correlation termed the Phillips curve is misleading. It may be a mirage pro- 
duced by a combination of overly aggregated data and inappropriate specifica- 
tion. If this vision proves correct, macroeconomics may find it valuable to turn 
more to microeconomic data. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper documents the existence of an international empirical regular- 
ity. The study of the wage curve fuses elements from, and seems to have 
implications for, macroeconomics, labor economics and regional economics. At 
this point, the main conclusions of the research are the following: 
1. A wage curve exists. Employees who work in areas of high unemploy- 
ment earn less, other things constant, than those who are surrounded by low 
unemployment. 
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2. A picture of this downward-sloping locus can be drawn with either 
regional unemployment or industry unemployment on the horizontal axis. 
3. The wage curve is almost identical across the countries of the world. 
Approximately the same curve holds in data from the United States, Great 
Britain, Germany, Canada, Austria, Holland, Switzerland, Korea, Norway, Ire- 
land, Italy, Japan, Australia, the Cote d'Ivoire, Sweden and India. It is also 
present, within nations, across different periods of time. 
4. In the countries studied in the book, the estimated unemployment 
elasticity of pay is approximately - 0.1. This uniformity runs counter to 
orthodox teaching (based on time-series analysis), which claims that countries 
have very different degrees of wage flexibility. 
5. Although matters are far from decided, it is difficult to see how the wage 
curve can be compatible with the textbook competitive model of the labor 
market. This idea takes some getting used to. A reader of the paper might ask, 
for example, why the observed curve could not be compatible with the simple 
view that, after a bad shock, slow adjustment in the labor market means we 
might often see high unemployment and low wages occurring together. This, 
however, confuses low wages with falling wages. It is the latter that unemploy- 
ment in a competitive market should produce. 
6. The idea of a Phillips curve may be misleading. This is another idea that 
is at first difficult to get one's mind around. Put in technical jargon, the 
autoregression commonly found in macroeconomic equations for the level of 
pay tends to disappear when micro data are used. More simply, it may not be 
sensible to think of there as being a relationship between unemployment and 
pay inflation, but rather one between (local) unemployment and the level of 
pay. 
7. Harris-Todaro orthodoxy, which says that regional wages are positively 
correlated with regional unemployment, seems to be misleading. 
8. Bargaining and efficiency wage models, because they give the correct 
prediction, are consistent with the wage-curve pattern. 
9. The wage curve helps to provide the missing empirical foundation-a 
flat quasi-supply function-for a new class of noncompetitive macroeconomic 
models. The evidence suggests that it is not a conventional labor-supply curve. 
10. Microeconomic data drawn from internationally comparable random 
samples provide economists of the 1990s with a rich new resource for testing 
hypotheses. Research of the kind described here probably only scratches the 
surface of what might be done in the future. 
* We thank Jacques Dreze, Carl Shapiro, Christopher Sims and Timothy 
Taylor for their comments on the first version of this paper. The paper draws 
partly upon a research monograph entitled The Wage Curve, published by MIT 
Press (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). The research was funded by the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council. 
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